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Abstract 
Our paper consists mainly to shed light into the field of bank capital structure and regulatory capital. We use the panel data set of 
bank leverage and tier 1 capital ratio. Our dataset comprises the 172 French banks; commercial banks, cooperative banks, 
investment banks and saving banks covering the period of 2002 to 2012. We estimate models with generalized method of 
moments (GMM). Our results support both the theory of corporate finance and the buffer view, where a tendency towards the 
latter seems to be evident for banks. This is consistent with an effect of capital regulation on bank capital structure. We introduce 
also Tier 1 capital ratio as an explanatory variable to analyse the effect of capital regulation. However, Tier 1 capital total for 
banks seems to be increased. This implies that Risk-Weighted Assets increased, which may stem from internal model 
improvements. Furthermore, we show that the number of unprofitable, dividend-paying banks decreased. Our result indicates that 
this type of risk-shifting, where equity holders are favored over debt holders. The issuance of equity seems to be applied as a last 
remedy used when earnings are declining. All these findings are confirmed after taking into account an alternative measure the 
regulatory capital ratio in order to examine the capital regulation compliance of banks. Our finding contributes to the lack of the 
literature by investigating in this field of research. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Peer-review under responsibility of Academic World Research and Education Center. 
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1. Introduction 
The financial structure of firms is a subject that has long attracted the interest of several researchers in finance. 
They attempted to address this problem (Modigliani and Miller 1958;1963 and Miller, 1977). By studying the impact 
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of means of financing on the performance and the determinants of financial structure, theoretical and empirical 
studies remain center point in the financial literature (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Myers, 1984; Titman and Wessels, 
1985.1988; Harris and Raviv, 1990,1991). Capital structure has triggered the interest of researchers (Gropp and 
Heider 2010; Goyal et al.. 2010). The finance literature indicates that market frictions and the types of available 
capital influence a firm’s capital structure. However, the financial institution is one of the most regulated and bank 
capital regulation is of utmost importance. 
In their research Gropp and Heider (2010) are interested to banks. The authors suggests that there are 
considerable similarities between banks’ and non-financial firms’ capital structure. Gropp and Heider (2010) show 
empirical regularities that are inconsistent with a first-order effect of capital regulation on banks’ capital structure. 
Harry and Stulz, R. M., (2013) find that banks maintain capital structure with leverage ratio that are much higher 
than those of virtually all operating firms that are not in financial distress. Our contribution is to shed light on the 
lack of the literature on banks and consensus on the determinants of capital structure.  
Following the triggering of the current systemic crisis caused by the subprime crisis in the American market, the 
literature on the funding does not rely only on regulatory requirements - Basel I (1998) and Basel II (2004). Other 
factors have emerged, including agreements and deposit insurance in the definition of bank capital structure 
(Harding, Liang and Ross, 2013; Miller, 1995). Studies on the determinants of capital structure were conducted both 
for banks in developed countries (Gropp and Heider 2010; Brewer et al., 2008); Cliff and Weber, (2008), and 
developing countries (Caglayan 2010; Ahmad et al., 2009; Octavia and Brown, 2008). Our contribution consists in 
considering the regulatory frame controlling banks ought to be the paramount determinant of bank capital structure. 
The specific nature of the deposit agreement and the level of bank debt imposed by regulatory constraints in 
general characterize Banks and financial institutions. Thus, these institutions have been excluded from previous 
empirical studies on the standard of the capital structure choices. Several empirical researches on the determinants of 
capital structure were focused on the American market ,Gropp and Heider (2010). The French financial industry did 
not receive any empirical studies. Our study contributes to the lack of the empirical investigation by looking at 
French banks. To our knowledge, this is the first paper that analyses the determinants of capital structure on French 
banks. In 2012, the French bank loans currently cover around 70% of business financing requirements, while the 
capital market fund 30%. These figures are overturned in the American context. Outstanding loans granted by 
French banks increased by +94% between 2000 and 2012. Outstanding loans rose by a further 1.7%, despite 
depressed economic growth. It seems to be an interesting context to study French banks. The main purpose of our 
paper is to investigate the determinants of bank capital structure and regulatory capital. Our sample adopts a panel of 
172 French banks; commercial banks, cooperative banks, investment banks and saving banks over the period of 
2002-2012 our database extracted from BankScope. Our paper contributes to situate this debate at the heart of the 
exploration of the French market. In our opinion, this is the first paper that develops the determinants of capital 
structure of French banks.  
Finally, we verify the robustness of our results. We take into account also an alternative measure of leverage.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the related literature of the 
determinants of banks Capital Structure and we introduce also the Regulatory Capital of Banks. Section 3 describes 
our sources of data, our sample selection process, our variables and methodologies used to measure capital structure. 
We analyse the results and discussion in Section 4 while Section 5 examines the results of the regression analysis 
with alternative measure. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. Literature review 
In this section we provide an overview of the existing literature on capital structure. We also examine the outline 
of the capital ratio and the Regulatory Capital of Banks. 
2.1. Determinants of banks Capital Structure 
The choice of company’s capital structure determinants has known several approach. Recently the authors 
examined whether conventional determinants of capital structure extend to banks. Octavia and Brown (2008) 
studied this problem in a sample of banks in developing countries. Gropp and Heider (2010) examine the American 
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banks and European banks and they say that there are significant similarities between the capital structures of banks 
and non-financial institutions. 
The anterior empirical literature on corporate debt converges on a number of standard variables that are related to 
the reliability of the capital structure of non-financial companies Rajan and Zingales (1995); Frank and Goyal (2004, 
2009) and considers transitory elements and permanent debt, Flannery and Rangan (2006, 2008) and Lemmon et al., 
(2008). 
The preponderance of studies of capital structure focuses mainly on the analysis of certain characteristics of the 
firm, for example, profitability, tangibility and size as determinants of debt. In addition, the capital structure may 
vary over time (Korajczyk and Levy, 2003), but often converges on relatively stable capital structures (Lemmon et 
al.. 2008), suggesting the existence of an optimal level of debt. Since the seminal paper by Modigliani and Miller 
(1958), which states that, in a world with any form of conflict, the corporate value is unaffected by the capital 
structure. Researchers have tried to identify the determinants that explain the indebtedness of the company. 
Flannery and Rangan (2008) and Gropp and Heider (2010) found considerable variation in banks 'capital ratios 
and examined if capital requirements are a factor of the first order of the banks' capital structure. Flannery and 
Rangan (2008) showed that banks have increased their equity participation, independently of regulatory 
requirements in the 1990s. This finding is interpreted as an effect of the implicit reduction of government 
guarantees. Gropp and Heider (2010) and Ozcan et al.(2012) conducted a similar analysis to that of Rajan and 
Zingales (1995) using Bankscope data with two cross-bank with a temporal variation. They focused on American 
banks between 1991 and 2004 and the 100 largest European banks to test the importance of size, profitability and 
tangibility. 
As for as non-financial firms, the empirical literature is generally converging on specific variables that have been 
found consistently correlated with debt: size, profitability, ratio of market-to-book, value guarantees and dividend 
policy. The size has to be positively related to debt (Titman and Wessels 1988, and Frank and Goyal 2005). 
Companies that have higher profitability tend to have lower debt (Rajan and Zingales 1995 and Frank and Goyal 
2005). 
Several Empirical studies on the determinants of the capital structure are characterized by the fact that there is not 
an overall structural theoretical model. However, they present a succession of corresponding assumptions at 
different theories on the matter as those we have mentioned above. This leads to a large number of potential 
determinants, the effects of debt can vary from one theory to another.  
2.2. Regulatory Capital of banks 
Subjects related to the problems of creating liquidity and bank credit risk were considered a priority. The capital 
structure of financial institutions has not received several researches (Marks and Santos, 2003). Also Gropp and 
Heider (2010) find that studies on the bank's capital structure are very limited. There are two reasons that the equity 
ratio does not significantly been studied there are not limits for deposits as well as the easy access to the capital 
market. The banks' capital structure is fundamentally different from that of non-financial companies because it 
includes deposits, a source of financing is generally absent in companies. To estimate the debt ratio most previous 
empirical studies have used (long-term debt divided by assets) to non-financial companies, while for financial firms, 
they have used the (total liabilities divided by the asset). 
Indeed, banks are required to hold a predetermined level of equity under Basel rules. However, the level of 
capital is determined by the requirements of the Bank, the risk and cost of capital. With the high cost of equity, bank 
leaders try to maintain the minimum capital requirement. However, if risk taking is high, they have to increase 
capital. 
The high cost of equity generally encourages bank managers to maintain the minimum required capital. However, 
they must increase if risk taking becomes high, Kohen and Santomero (1980) have shown that a rules based solely 
on the report "capital / assets" can’t necessarily lead to the desired results. They proposed a relation to risk-weighted 
assets, and demonstrated the influence of other factors: the growth of deposits, asset size and income. 
Berger et al.. (1995) study the theory of capital in financial institutions and demonstrate that market frictions are 
due to the existence of tax and financial distress costs and transaction costs and asymmetric information. These 
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factors are valid for both businesses and financial institutions. In other words, transaction costs and information 
asymmetry can affect the capital structure similar to the cost of financial distress. 
Brewer et al. (2008), show that the hypotheses of "trade-off" with the restrictive regulations have a testable 
prediction. For example, if there is only one report, banks should operate above the minimum required. Also the 
hypotheses of the theory of "Pecking Order" assign an important role to government rules. With hypotheses of non-
binding regulation, both theories have the same results. They maintain that the market forces play an important role. 
In fact, they examine the banks maintain their capital above the minimum required. 
Gropp and Heider (2010) referring to the empirical literature on non-financial companies account for the major 
listed bank capital structure. They discover empirical regularities that are inconsistent with a first-order effect of 
capital regulation on bank capital structure. The authors show the existence of important similarities between the 
capital structure of banks and non-financial companies. 
The minimum regulatory capital requirements introduced by the Basel agreements are considered as a key 
determinant of capital structure. Berger et al. (1995) show that the theory of corporate capital structure cannot be 
fully applied to financial institutions. This is due to regulation. They also highlighted the importance of external 
factors affecting bank capital. Diamond and Rajan (2000) argue that the high capital reduces liquidity creation by 
the bank avoiding bankruptcy. 
Asarkaya and Ozcan (2007) find that when economic growth is high, banks make more profits. This benefit can 
help to increase their capital. Thus, they hold more capital. These authors show that with the Basel I, the concept of 
capital used in the approach to risk-based capital could not adequately explain the bank's ability to offset losses. 
They also highlighted that the risk criteria were not satisfactory. Gropp and Heider (2007) find that profitable banks 
tend to have relatively more equity. Their results are consistent with the prediction of the theory of "Pecking Order" 
hypothesis that attributes an important role to government rules. Kleff and Weber (2008) have shown that the level 
of capital is positively correlated with profit. The accumulation of profit generates capital growth. Mathuva (2009) 
find that bank profitability is positively related to capital ratio and Tier 1 capital ratio. This study uses the return on 
assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) as an estimate of profitability of the bank for the period 1998 to 2007. It 
also establishes that there is a negative relationship between capital ratio and equity.  
Ho and Hsu (2010) examine the relationship between the financial structure of companies and their investment 
strategies in the banking industry in Taiwan. They prove that the restrictions on the capital adequacy ratio had 
actually influenced the investment strategies. They indicate that the market share and debt are positively related. 
They stated that the company's performance is significantly and positively related to the size, leverage and cost of 
the company. Finally, the regression results show that the financial structures of banking firms are positively related 
to the business cycle conditions. 
We started by followed a description of the process of extracting data to be used in our empirical analysis and 
finally the choice of the variables to include in our model. We report the descriptive statistics of our sample. 
3. Data and methodology 
We describe the data selection, which is used for empirical investigation, and overviews methodologies of the 
determinant of capital structure. After we finish by presenting our dependent, independent and control variables. 
3.1. Sample selection 
Our paper contains a sample of French banks covering the period of 2000-2012. Therefore, our final sample 
consisted of 172 banks; commercial banks, cooperative banks, investment banks and saving banks. This data are 
extracted from BankScope database.  
The majority of researches by several author such as Gropp and Heider (2010) exams the large banks. Our paper 
explores the French banking system that is characterized by unification and integration of the financial service 
market within a European framework established between 1993 and 1999 under the leadership of the European 
commission had stated in 1993 the imposition of the ratio Cooke as European solvency ratio. The adoption of 
European currency began at 2002. The status of the cooperative Companies of banks was attributed to the savings 
banks and the credit banks in 1999. In 2002, the mutual establishments entered into the federation of the French 
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banks. The liberalization of credits establishes the bases of an efficient and utter competition between the banks and 
other establishments of the credit in a national global market. This has showing the French banks to an international 
fierce competition. The reorganization movement that affected the banks has carried its path till 2002. We cite as an 
example, the competition that took place between the BNP and the Agricultural Credit for the control of Lyonnais 
credit and the upcoming projects of restructuring. It is the same case for the fusion concerning the popular banks and 
the funds of the agricultural credit. Thus the evolution of the number of banks in recent years confirms a downward 
trend already observed since 2003. The following table lists the French banks. 
 
            Table 1. The French banks 
Year 2003 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
French banks 264 239 230 214 204 195 186 
3.2. Methodology 
The aim of our model is to analyze the capital structure and regulatory capital of banks. The debt of a company is 
dynamic in nature because there are adjustments costs; these costs are represented by the lagged variable of the debt 
ratio. Moreover, traditional econometric methods as MCO and generalized least squares almost do not provide 
efficient estimates of such a model. To solve this problem, we will use the model for panel data proposed by 
Arellano and Bond (1991) and later developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). This 
method reduces the endogeneity of variables, and control individual and time specific effects. Our paper applies the 
dynamic panel data approach proposed and uses the dynamic panel generalized method of moments (GMM). In 
referring to the theoretical and empirical studies reported, we specify the following basic model: 
 
Yit (LEV) E0 DYit1 E1DTA it E2Collit E3 Profit E4GTAit E5LAita E6DNIit E7LLRit Zit    (1) 
 
Where i = 1… N; t = 1…T; N refers to the banks number; T indicates time refers to the period of analysis and β is 
the estimated parameter. The coefficient α is the estimated persistent coefficient of leverage banks. A positive and 
significant α implies that leverage levels will be maintained from one year to the next. Thus, it is crucial to consider 
the persistent of leverage through the dynamic panel data model (Gropp and Heider, 2010). 
The independent variable LEV is the leverage measured by the debt ratio, which is the ratio of equity to total assets. 
The dependent variables are the variables of deposits that are described in the following sections. We employ the 
annual variables obtained from BankScope for the French banks in our sample over the period 2002–2012. 
DTA is the deposits, Coll is collateral, Prof is profitability by using ROA, GTA is growth measure, LA is size log of 
total assets, DNI is the ratio of dividend and LLR is Loan loss reserve. 
3.3. Variables definition 
In this subsection, we present different procedures used to measure the dependent and independent variables. 
Referring to the theories of capital structure and to the study of Gropp and Heider (2010) we use the following 
variables: size, profitability, collateral, growth opportunities, risk, and dividends. 
The dependent variable debt ratio is the ratio of equity to total assets. An elevate ratio result in a low risk of 
bankruptcy. Thus, the access to funds is done at a low cost that results the increase of profits. While financial debt 
agency costs between shareholders and lenders may have a negative impact. 
Our aim is to choose the measures of capital structure and regulatory; we select first the most used measures to 
make comparisons with the previous literature. For purpose of further research, expand analysis and verify the 
robustness of the results we used a specific measures to the financial sector. We are including the measure of 
deposits and collateral. The banks' capital structure is fundamentally different from the non-financial companies 
because it includes deposits; a source of financing is generally absent in companies. To estimate the debt ratio, in 
most previous empirical studies, they used long-term debt divided by assets in non-financial companies and chosen 
the total liabilities divided by assets for financial firms. A high deposit level reduces the risk of bankruptcy and 
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liquidity of financial institutions involving a positive effect on debt. Deposit activities have a stabilizing effect on 
the income of the bank. 
The collateral is positively related to the debt. First of all, holding a high proportion of tangible assets, this may 
serve as collateral in the issuance of debt. The Trade-Off Theory shows that the reduction of moral hazard reduces 
the risks associated with holding debt, which again lowers the cost of debt, ultimately allowing firms to be more 
levered, without increasing the costs of financial distress.  
We introduce specific control variables to the financial sector in the model. The return on assets and return on 
equity (ROE and ROA) are used as an indicator of profitability. In general, banks must rely primarily on retained 
earnings to increase capital. Gropp and Heider (2007) found that the most profitable banks tend to have more capital 
relative to assets. 
According to Frank and Goyal, (2003) the growth opportunities GTA in the Static Trade-Off Theory predicts a 
negative relationship between growth opportunities and leverage. The Pecking Order Theory the debt limits the 
ability to take on profitable investment opportunities. Due to the empirical consensus concerning the negative 
relationship between growth opportunities and leverage, the expected effects are verifying in this investigation. 
The size is measured by the logarithm of total assets. According to the theory of the Trade-Off, assets, loan 
portfolio and the activities of large institutions are generally much more diversified than smaller institutions Rajan 
and Zingales (1995). This difference has an effect on the degree of risk that banks take, regardless of their degree of 
international diversification (Frank and Goyal (2003), Leary and Robert (2010))Rajan and Zingales (1995) 
confirmed that large institutions are more in debt, according to the theory of Trade-Off. The institution's size has a 
positive effect on the debt. 
Frank and Goyal (2005) estimate that there is a negative relationship between the dividend and debt. According 
Gropp and Heider (2007), banks face a higher cost of issuing shares due to information asymmetry. The banks that 
pay dividends are expected to face lower cost of issuing shares because they are well known for their partners, 
preferring equity financing. They also found a negative relationship between the actions and the ratio of debt, while 
Octavia and Brown (2010) could not conclude because of mixed results when examining the book values and 
market values of debt. 
The loan loss reserves are defined as a reserve evaluation on the total loans of the bank, which represents the 
amount considered sufficient to cover estimated losses in the loan portfolio. Reserves for loan losses in the ratio of 
loans are considered as an approximation of the risk of financial institutions. The negative impact of reserves for 
loan losses in the capital could mean that banks in financial difficulty more difficult to increase their capital ratios. 
However, a positive effect could be a sign that banks voluntarily increase their capital in order to overcome their bad 
financial situation. We summarize in table 2 the variables and  expected relationship with the dependent variable. 
             
           Table 2. Predicted Effects of Explanatory Variables on Leverage. 
Variables  Definition Corporate 
Finance 
Buffer View 
Panel A: Dependent Variables     
LEV The equity to assets ratio   
KT Tier 1 capital ratio   
Panel B: Independent Variables     
DTA The ratio of deposits to assets + + 
Coll Collateral + NA 
Panel C: Control Variables     
LA log total assets + +/- 
Prof ROA: Net income / total assets - + 
GTA The ratio of net loans to total assets - + 
DNI Cash Dividends Paid and Declared/ Net Income (%) - + 
LLR Loan Loss Reserve / Gross Loans (%) - - 
3.4. Summary statistics 
The table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables brought in our 
empirical investigation and the significance test. We chose panel data for our sample. 
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       Table 3. Summary statistics. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Panel A: Dependent Variables      
LEV 1892 5,86 7,67 0 99,95 
Panel B: Independent Variables 
 
DTA 1892 0,52 0,61 0 6,96 
Coll 1892 0,00 0,06 0 0,99 
Panel C: Control Variables   
 
Prof 1892 0,14 0,21 -0,15 0,85 
GTA 1892 6,00 24,08 -69,59 411,66 
LA 1892 11,38 7,25 0 21,45 
DNI 1892 16,37 45,13 -178,04 841,58 
LLR 1892 1,93 3,09 0 37,03 
 
    Panel A shows that the leverage mean value is 5,86 with a high standard deviation of 7,67. The debt ratio shows a 
high variability. This dispersion of data can be explained by the impact of crisis during the period of our study 
between 2007 and 2009. This period is characterized by a negative impact on debt.  
 
   Table 4. The pairwise correlation matrix for dependent (LEV) and explanatory variables. 
 LEV DTA Coll Prof GTA LA DNI LLR 
LEV 1.0000         
DTA 0.4762* 1.0000        
Coll -0.0315 -0.0198 1.0000       
Prof 0.0390 0.2558* 0.0309 1.0000      
GTA 0.0662* 0.1046* -0.0021 0.0697* 1.0000     
LA 0.4302* 0.4820* 0.1055* 0.2768* 0.1542* 1.0000    
DNI -0.0098 0.0859* 0.0579* 0.1899* 0.0008 0.2244* 1.0000   
LLR 0.2212* 0.2363* 0.0374 0.1603* -0.0074 0.3260* 0.1289* 1.0000  
 
     We try to verify the quality of panel B. The value of the DTA amounted to an average of 0,52 respectively in our 
study. These variables take low averages ranging 0,61. The variation in the sample is important.  Panel C shows that 
the dispersion around the mean is proportionately low, since the standard deviation was respectively 0,331 and 
1,184. Similarly, the average value of the variables GTA, LA and LLR is between 6 and 11,38. Their standard 
deviation value is high ranging between 7,25 and 24,08. The average value of the dividend DNI is 16,37 and its 
standard deviation is 45,13.  
4. Results and discussion 
In this section we present, interpret and discuss our results in detail with the aim of drawing the conclusions of 
our sample of the French banks. 
4.1. Capital structure of French banks  
We analyze the results of our investigation. We start with the coefficients of the control variables. We expound 
an interesting finding. All coefficients are statistically significant at the one percent level, except collateral, which is 
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insignificant. Table 5 shows that the persistent of leverage measured by lagged LEVt-1 is positively significant at 
1% and confirms the dynamic nature of the model. The coefficient is at the order of 0.13, indicating moderate 
persistence debt for French banks. 
 
Table 5. Examining the Explanatory Power of the Determinants of Bank Leverage / Tier 1 Capital Ratio. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 





















          
L.Dep 0.134*** 0.134*** 0.177*** 0.643*** 0.642*** 0.645*** 0.164*** 0.164*** 0.161*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DTA 5.067*** 5.069***  -0.216*** -
0.380*** 
 11.938*** 11.912***  
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  
Coll 0.711  -3.409 6.584***  5.733*** 7.297  -5.851** 
 (0.789)  (0.462) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.286)  (0.032) 
Prof -22.559*** -22.649*** -18.654*** -1.421*** 0.279 -1.186 18.625*** 18.904*** 20.485*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.505) (0.102) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GTA -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.016*** -0.001 -
0.002*** 
0.000 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.002 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.000) (0.300) (0.000) (0.930) (0.000) (0.000) (0.228) 
LA 0.305*** 0.305*** 0.491*** 0.052*** 0.068*** 0.046*** -0.102** -0.099** 0.494*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.017) (0.000) 
DNI -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.017*** -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.012*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.880) (0.683) (0.621) (0.803) (0.819) (0.000) 
LLR 0.569*** 0.569*** 0.906*** 0.028* 0.011 0.012 1.232*** 1.232*** 1.460*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.068) (0.497) (0.502) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.876*** 0.889*** 0.372 -0.112 -0.271* -0.152 -6.071*** -6.099*** -6.271*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.244) (0.464) (0.075) (0.370) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
          
Observations 1,720 1,620 1,540 1,720 1,670 1,820 1,620 1,540 1,650 
Number of N 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 
Wald chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
P 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 
Sargan test 132.303 132.374 108.678 41.076 68.441 41.190 121.589 121.894 118.404 
P 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.883 0.075 0.880 0.001 0.001 0.000 
AR1 0.015 0.015 0.050 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.296 0.296 0.321 
AR2 0.738 0.733 0.902 0.959 0.987 0.999 0.343 0.343 0.313 
Notes: This table reports the determinant of capital structure of 172 French Banks covering 2000-2012 totaling 4532 observations using the system 
GMM estimator developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (2000). LEV: leverage bank capital measured as the ratio of 
equity to total assets; KT Tier 1 capital ratio; DTA The ratio of deposits to assets; Coll Collateral; SIZE: LA log total assets; Prof ROA: Net income 
/ total assets; GTA The ratio of net loans to total assets; DNI Cash Dividends Paid and Declared/ Net Income (%) LLR Loan Loss Reserve / Gross 
Loans (%). T-values are in parentheses. LEV (t-1) indicates the lagged one period of the dependent variable. AR (2) denotes the Arellano–Bond test 
for the 2nd-order autocorrelation in first differences. The Hansen test: the null hypothesis is defined as the instruments used that are not correlated 
with the residuals. * Statistical significance at the 10% level. ** Statistical significance at the 5% level. *** Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 
The deposits are a source of financing and have a significant positive impact on leverage of French banks. A high 
deposit level reduces the risk of bankruptcy and liquidity.  
The collateral is insignificant like the predicted effects of buffer view, which is not affirmed about the effect of 
collateral on leverage. The regular perception is that bank, which is characterized with more assets, may be acting as 
collateral, and should be capable to increase their leverage. 
The estimated coefficients of profitability have a high negative impact on leverage of French banks. Hence, the 
operational sign is in accordance with the results of Gropp and Heider (2010) and the corporate finance prediction; 
the banks opt for internal over external financing, in referring to the Pecking Order Theory and the Agency Theory. 
The main explanation proposed is that the banking sector is characterized by rapid growth in the period between the 
2000 to the financial crisis in 2007. Liikanen et al., (2012) shows that the majority of banks have accumulated 
profits; by this way they fund their operations instead of increasing leverage. 
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Growth is negatively correlated with banks. The negative effect on the actual growth opportunities is may be 
explained by high dispersion. This is confirmed by the corporate finance. The growth is defined by changes in net 
interest income and fee income reflecting potential growth of part of the business, which is not related to lending 
activities. 
The impact of Size appears to be constant to the French banks as compared to results of Gropp and Heider 
(2010). In referring to corporate finance as well as buffer view our result confirms the predicted sign of the size. 
Dividends are significant in all three estimations, which is consistent with the results of Gropp and Heider (2010) 
and a prediction of the corporate finance view. Furthermore, for the banks, the share of unprofitable dividend paying 
banks was in fact clearly increasing over the time of financial crisis included in our period of investigation. 
The risk has a positive coefficient, presenting an opposite sign in referring to the corporate finance and buffer 
view. It can be explained by the low diversity asset volatility in the financial crisis and high average value. The 
regulatory effect that obligates the risky banks to reduce leverage, by this way they increases their capital base. 
Therefore, our results for the French banks are in line with corporate finance predictions of the bank capital 
structure explanation, but it isn’t the same for all estimation with the results of Gropp and Heider (2010). 
Furthermore, we introduce the regulation that should be more important for banks in a period, where the regulatory 
outline has been tightened. 
4.2. Regulatory Capital of French banks 
In this part an alternative way of analyzing the role of regulation, we use Tier 1 Capital Ratio with the same 






The deposits have a negative impact on Tier 1 Capital Ratio of French banks. The collateral coefficient is 
positively significant like the predicted effects of corporate finance; banks with more collateral were actually more 
levered. These results are confirmed with Gropp and Heider (2010). Size has a positive operational sign, implying 
that large banks have a higher Tier 1 Capital Ratio. This is in line with the results for the leverage, thus finding 
confirmed the corporate finance and the buffer view. The negative coefficient of profitability like in corporate 
finance, implying that banks prefer to build up capital by retaining their earnings, which also is in line with the 
finding of leverage. The growth opportunities have a negative operational sign, which is in line with the buffer view. 
The dividends is negatively insignificant implying that if the banks pays out dividend the bank has a lower Tier 1 
Capital Ratio, which is natural due to the fact that banks not paying out dividends could accumulate earnings 
instead, thereby increasing their Tier 1 Capital Ratio. This result is in line with the buffer view. Risk is a positive 
effect. In referring to the regulatory forcing more risky banks to obtain a higher Tier 1 Capital Ratio. This is in line 
with both corporate finance and the buffer view. 
4.3. Alternative Measure 
In this we analyze the role of regulation; we use another measure with the same explanatory variables. The 
finding is compared with results of leverage regression. The deposits have a positive impact for French banks. The 
collateral coefficient is negatively significant when introduced in regression without deposit; banks with more 
collateral were actually less levered. Size has a negative effect in this case. This is in line with the results for the 
leverage, thus finding confirmed the buffer view. The positive coefficient of profitability like in buffer view, which 
is not in line with the finding of leverage. The growth opportunities have a negative operational sign, which is in line 
with the buffer view. The dividends is negatively insignificant meaning that if the banks pay out dividend, his results 
are confirmed with Gropp and Heider (2010), which is natural due to the fact that banks are not paying out 
dividends and could accumulate earnings instead. This result is in line with the corporate finance. Risk is a negative 
effect; this is not in line with both corporate finance and the buffer view. 
Tier1CapitalRatio Tier1Capital
RiskWeightedAssets
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The overall findings confirm the results of Gropp and Heider (2010), while also opposite finding of the 
impact of regulation on bank capital structure. However our paper adds new findings to the literature by studying the 
French bank when studying regulatory capital compliance. 
5. Summary 
In our paper, we use a panel data regression approach on French banks in the period of 2002-2012; we study 
the determinants of capital structure and regulatory capital. We refer to the bank capital structure of the regulator, 
the buffer and the corporate finance. Our finding was compared with the study of Gropp and Heider (2010). 
The finding of our investigation supporting both the corporate finance and the buffer view; we find that the 
regulatory view is not the overriding determinant of bank capital structure. Indeed, the results confirmed the 
corporate finance. The buffer view seems to be evident for alternative measure. This result is in line with an effect of 
regulation on bank capital structure.  
Our results indicate that the bank characteristic determinants such as size, profitability, growth, risk, 
collateral and dividends explain a great amount of the variation of bank leverage, while the explanatory power 
seems lower when introducing Tier 1 Capital Ratio. However, the heterogeneity of the country and time level appear 
more significant in explaining the variation in the dependent variables. 
 However, we propose an effect of regulation by using liabilities ratio as a determinant of bank capital 
structure. Our empirical investigations show specifically that the French banks are in line with the finding of the 
bank leverage. Furthermore, regulatory capital compliance exposed some interesting tendencies. Total tier 1 capital 
ratio should be touched in the period of crisis. All these results hold for both banks are optimizing their regulatory 
capital by adopting multiple components all related to the Tier 1 capital Ratio. 
Moreover the finding shows contradictory evidence in terms of the impact of regulation on bank capital structure. 
Also, as the importance of French banks and different bank business models, as well as by studying regulatory 
capital compliance. Our results are significant and also confirmed to leverage. Finally, through our analysis, we 
highlight that French banks is a point of departure for future searching and interesting to the period of investigation 
including the crisis. 
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